What can we learn from Musīla and Nārada? by Bronkhorst, Johannes
  
What can we learn from Mus¥la and 
Nårada? ‡ 
 
      Johannes Bronkhorst ∗   
 
Abstract 
The puzzle presented by Mus¥la and Nårada (both have 
attained the same knowledge/insight, but one is an Arhat, the other 
one is not) has raised questions regarding the Buddhist path to 
liberation from the time of La Vallée Poussin onward. The present 
paper argues that the final stages of this path had become obscure 
to at least certain members of the Buddhist community from an 
early date onward. It then raises the question of whether modern 
psychological understanding may shed light on this issue. It 
concludes with the observation that we may need some theoretical 
scaffolding, to be provided by modern scholarship, to understand 
what the early Buddhist texts are talking about.  
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Mus¥la and Nårada are the names of two monks who figure 
in the Kosamb¥-sutta of the Saµyutta-nikåya.1 In this dialogue, first 
Mus¥la is questioned about his spiritual state. We learn that he 
knows through his own knowledge the causal relationships found 
in the chain of ‘Conditioned Origination’ (Skt: prat¥tyasamutpåda; 
P: pa†iccasamuppåda). The Påli, in the translation of Bhikkhu 
Bodhi, has: "Friend Mus¥la, apart from faith, apart from personal 
preference, apart from oral tradition, apart from reasoned reflection, 
apart from acceptance of a view after pondering it, does the 
Venerable Mus¥la have personal knowledge thus: ‘With birth as 
condition, aging-and-death comes to be’?"2 He also knows that the 
cessation of becoming is Nirvåˆa. The questioner concludes from 
this that the venerable Mus¥la is an Arhat, one whose influxes 
(åsrava) are destroyed. Mus¥la’s silence betrays his agreement with 
this. Next Nårada asks to be questioned in the same way. He 
answers the same questions in exactly the same words. However, 
he rejects the conclusion that he is an Arhat, one whose influxes 
are destroyed. He explains this with the help of a simile. Just as 
when a man who is hot and thirsty finds a well in the wilderness, 
he sees the well and knows that it contains water, but alas, he 
cannot reach and touch the water. In the same way he, Nårada, 
even though he knows that the cessation of becoming is Nirvåˆa, is 
no Arhat, and his influxes have not been destroyed. 
Louis de La Vallée Poussin has drawn attention to this story 
in a well-known article (1937). He identified the two positions here 
represented with the two positions that are called Såµkhya and 
Yoga in the Bhagavadg¥tå: in Såµkhya, liberation is entirely or 
primarily obtained by means of knowledge, i.e., intellectual effort; 
in Yoga, this goal is reached by means of ascetic practice.3 In my 
book, Buddhist Teaching in India, I accepted La Vallée Poussin's 
identification (Bronkhorst 2009: 57-58). I no longer think that it is fully 
correct. I now think that Mus¥la illustrates the view that came to 
predominate in Buddhism, according to which Nirvåˆa is a largely 
                                                           
1  For the Påli, see Feer 1884-1898, vol. 2, 115ff. The discourse has a parallel in 
the Chinese Samyuktågama (Taishō 99: 98c - 99a). 
2  Bodhi 2000: 610. In the Påli (Feer 1884-1898, vol. 2, 115), the pasage reads: 
aññatreva åvuso musīla saddhåya aññatra ruciyå aññatra anussavå aññatra 
åkåraparivitakkå aññatra di††hinijjhånakkhantiyå atthåyasmato musīlassa 
paccattam eva ñåˆaµ jåtipaccayå jaråmaraˆanti?  
3  La Vallée Poussin 1937: 189-90, with references to Edgerton 1924: 27. 
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if not entirely cognitive matter: if one has the right knowledge or 
insight, liberation is attained. Nårada, on the other hand, gives 
expression to the alternative belief that Buddhist liberation is not 
primarily cognitive in nature.4  
I accept that the story of Mus¥la and Nårada distinguishes 
two positions, even though I do not wish to suggest that there was a 
dispute or conflict between the upholders of these two positions; 
nor do I claim that they were thought of as two paths to liberation.5 
To make sense of these positions, I propose to distinguish between 
the following three alternatives that might be held to take the 
practitioner to the highest goal: (1) ordinary knowledge of 
Buddhist doctrine; (2) the special insight that may arise in certain 
meditative states; (3) the internal modifications that a practitioner 
may bring about in him- or herself in certain meditative states. I 
will try to explore the differences between these alternatives with 
the help of the notion of absorption (See also Bronkhorst 2017).  
Ordinary awareness is interpreted awareness. It is 
interpreted in the light of our memories of earlier experiences and 
other mental contents, through a network of mainly unconscious 
mental associations. 
Absorption is a form of deep concentration that plays a role 
in profound meditation; the term in the early Buddhist texts that 
comes closest to it is samådhi. Being a form of deep concentration, 
it reduces the number and/or strength of mental associations. If the 
absorption is deep enough, this will have a cognitive effect: 
awareness will be less interpreted. 6  Those who have had it 
                                                           
4  More recent publications that deal with this episode and with two contrasting 
positions in Buddhism in general include Griffiths 1981, which is criticized 
in Kaur 2016; Bodhi 2003; Fuller 2005, 101; Gombrich 2006, 110 ff.; Arbel 
2016, 81 n. 117; Anålayo 2016 and 2017, 90-101. See also Polak 2011, 167-
168, and 2016; and Cousins 2009. 
5  Bodhi 2003, Arbel 2016, Anålayo 2016 and 2017: 90-101, and Kaur 2016 do 
not think that two positions are contrasted. 
6  Certain authors feel critical about the very notion of less interpreted (or even 
totally uninterpreted) awareness. Robert Sharf, who is one of them, yet 
writes (2015: 476): “I suspect that when medieval meditation masters used 
terms such as ‘falling into emptinesss’ and ‘meditation sickness’ they were 
targeting techniques that resulted in an intense immersion in the moment, in 
the now, such that the practitioner loses touch with the socially, culturally, 
and historically constructed world in which he or she lives.” In a more 
recent article (2018), Sharf expresses himself less categorically. 
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commonly describe this changed awareness as a deeper insight; we 
may call it mystical insight, not to be confused with intellectual 
understanding. 
Experiencing less interpreted awareness can be a shattering 
and memorable event, and many who have had it will try to repeat 
it or convince others of the deeper insight they believe to have 
gained. But the experience will leave the person essentially as she 
was before. It may provide an insight, but cannot be claimed to 
destroy attachments and put an end to suffering. For this, more than 
mystical insight is required. 
The three alternatives I mentioned earlier now look as 
follows: 
(1) Ordinary knowledge of Buddhist doctrine (“intellectual 
understanding”). 
(2) Mystical insight resulting from absorption. 
(3) A permanently transformed psychological state that is 
the outcome of certain modifications that have been 
brought about in the mind while in a state of 
absorption: the destruction of the influxes (åsrava). 
The story of Mus¥la and Nårada is not fully clear on some 
points. It tells us that Mus¥la knows certain things through personal 
knowledge (paccattam eva ñåˆaµ). It does not tell us whether this 
personal knowledge is intellectual understanding or rather mystical 
insight obtained in deep meditation, even though the list of 
qualifications ("apart from faith, apart from personal preference, 
apart from oral tradition, apart from reasoned reflection, apart from 
acceptance of a view after pondering it") may suggest the latter of 
these two. It is however also possible that the author of this passage 
did not know the difference between intellectual understanding and 
mystical insight. Or he did not have the vocabulary to clearly 
distinguish between the two and tried to convey that Mus¥la had 
had mystical insight. We will see that the two forms of awareness 
are often confused in Buddhist literature. Our analysis should make 
clear that Mus¥la's position did not necessarily concern only 
intellectual understanding. What is more, the opposition embodied 
in Mus¥la and Nårada is not an opposition between intellectual 
reasoning — corresponding to (1) — and absorption — 
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corresponding to (2).7 Rather, their opposition is either between (1) 
intellectual understanding and (3) psychological transformation; or 
between (2) insight resulting from absorption and (3) psychological 
transformation. 
Nårada's position is clearer than Mus¥la’s in this respect. He 
states in so many words that the third alternative is missing, that he 
has not reached the permanently transformed psychological state 
that is brought about by the destruction of the influxes. And the 
fact that this (presumably) diligent and committed Buddhist admits 
that he has not reached that state strongly suggests that he does not 
know how to get there. 
Not all those who practice meditation can bring about a 
state of absorption that is deep enough to have cognitive effects; 
perhaps most meditators cannot. They may yet know from others 
that successful meditation can lead to mystical insight. They may 
be tempted to concentrate on the supposed contents of this mystical 
insight, hoping to reach in this way the mystical state, not being 
aware that that knowledge by itself is not enough. Acquiring some 
profound knowledge may in their mind replace meditative practice. 
Understanding “Conditioned Origination” (prat¥tyasamutpåda, Pa 
pa†iccasamuppåda), and knowing that the cessation of becoming is 
Nirvåˆa may in this way come to be looked upon as methods to 
gain the highest goal. This is what we see in much of the Buddhist 
scriptural tradition: much emphasis on the insights that a Buddhist 
practitioner is expected to attain. I merely mention the 
Prajñåpåramitå literature, i.e., the literature on the perfection of 
wisdom. Attaining this highest wisdom becomes an intellectual 
task rather than something that accompanies deep absorption. 
Nårada's remarks show that there were at least some in the 
Buddhist tradition who held on to the view that attaining Nirvåˆa 
was not exclusively, or even primarily, a cognitive affair. In fact, 
Richard Gombrich (2006: 114-115) reminds us that four different 
views find expression in the early texts:  
(1) meditation is a training essential for understanding;  
                                                           
7  This is the opposition to which also Anålayo 2017 objects, stating: “the idea 
that insight into the four noble truths is a matter of intellectual reasoning is 
unconvincing. … the same holds also for … the belief that absorption is in 
itself the path to liberation (106).” 
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(2) both methods must to some extent be employed, but 
either may be given priority;  
(3) the two methods are alternatives;  
(4) understanding is so superior to meditation that it may be 
used alone, whereas meditation on its own can 
never achieve enlightenment.  
This last view illustrates that the Buddhist tradition came to 
emphasize the cognitive side of the path, often at the expense of the 
transformational side (even though paying lip service to it). And 
yet, there are good reasons to believe that Nårada's position was 
closer to the teaching of the historical Buddha. And as I pointed out 
earlier, it also seems likely that many practitioners, like Nårada, 
did not know how to bring this transformation about.  
The notion of absorption, which I introduced earlier, 
allowed us to distinguish two kinds of knowledge: ordinary 
knowledge, i.e. intellectual understanding, and what I called 
mystical knowledge. Deep absorption has cognitive effects, and 
gives in this way rise to an awareness that is different from 
ordinary awareness. Those who strive to attain deep states of 
meditation may mistakenly think that they can get there by 
mastering what mystical knowledge is expected to be like. This is a 
mistake, because mystical knowledge cannot be attained through 
intellectual effort. Significantly, the one word that pops up again 
and again in studies of mysticism, at least since the days of 
William James, is ineffable. Mystical knowledge is not normally of 
the kind that can be expressed in words. 
Does the notion of absorption explain the third alternative 
which we distinguished? Does it explain what is meant by the 
"destruction of the influxes" (åsrava)? I raised the question 
whether perhaps Nårada had difficulties understanding what this 
was all about. Can we do any better? 
Many texts mention a liberating insight in connection with 
this crucial phase of the Buddhist path to liberation. Interestingly, 
different texts describe this liberating insight differently. In some it 
is knowledge of the Four Noble Truths, in others the knowledge of 
the destruction of the influxes (åsrava), or the knowledge of past 
lives and the knowledge of the passing away and reappearance of 
beings; sometimes it is the knowledge that the Five Aggregates 
(skandha) are not mine, not I and not my self; or the thought that 
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the Five Aggregates appear and disappear; or the insight that the 
aggregates are empty, void and without substance. In some texts, 
doctrinal points that have gained in importance become part of the 
liberating knowledge. Examples are the doctrines of Conditioned 
Origination (prat¥tyasamutpåda) and of the selflessness of the 
person ([pudgala-]nairåtmya) (see Bronkhorst 2009: 30-31). One can 
only conclude, with Wynne (2007: 108), that the content of 
liberating insight in the earliest teaching is unclear. Indeed, I have 
suggested long ago that originally no specific content was 
attributed to this insight at all (Bronkhorst 1993: 99-100, 108). 
Perhaps I can do better today. The detailed description of 
the path to liberation that is repeated so many times in so many 
Sūtras, culminates in the following:8 
When his concentrated mind is thus purified, bright, 
unblemished, rid of imperfection, malleable, wieldy, steady, 
and attained to imperturbability, he directs it to knowledge 
of the destruction of the influxes. He understands as it 
actually is: ‘This is suffering’; [...] ‘This is the origin of 
suffering’; [...] ‘This is the cessation of suffering’; [...] ‘This 
is the way leading to the cessation of suffering’; [...] ‘These 
are the influxes’; [...] ‘This is the origin of the influxes’; [...] 
‘This is the cessation of the influxes’; [...] ‘This is the way 
leading to the cessation of the influxes’. 
If we keep in mind that the one characteristic that all 
mystical experiences appear to share is ineffability, these words 
may come as close as they possibly could to the realization that the 
path to the cessation of the influxes can be known, and can only be 
known, in that particular state. 
But let us return to the Buddhist tradition. The variety of 
liberating insights in the ancient texts confirms our earlier 
observation that the Buddhist tradition had come to look upon 
knowledge as a crucial element on the path to liberation. Indeed, 
discovering this or that knowledge had come to be thought of as 
leading to liberation, with the sometimes added requirement that 
this knowledge had to be attained in a state of deep meditation. 
A detailed study of a number of passages from the Pali 
canon leads Richard Gombrich (2006: 131), to quote him once again, 
to the following claims: 
                                                           
8 For further details about the path to liberation, see Bronkhorst 2009: 12-19. 
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1. that Enlightenment without meditation was probably never 
envisaged by the Buddha or in the earliest texts ... 
2. that paññå-vimutti came to refer to Enlightenment without 
meditation (or at least without certain specific 
meditational attainments) ... 
3. that in the end ... there were ... groups of monks in the Pali 
tradition who left meditation to others, without 
renouncing the quest for Enlightenment. 
I think Gombrich is right, and that this claimed 
development agrees with our reflections. 
Whether or not we accept that Nårada is “simply a literary 
conceit, a pre-text” (Gómez 1999: 700), we can confidently state that 
he was not pleased with this development. From his point of view, 
the destruction of the influxes was misinterpreted as being a 
cognitive affair, an event in which the discovery of some kind of 
knowledge (ordinary or mystical) was responsible for the crucial 
transformation aimed at. 
The fact that our early texts give so many different contents 
to this liberating knowledge shows that there was no unanimity in 
this respect. And according to Nårada, this exclusive emphasis on 
knowledge or insight was quite simply mistaken. Liberation is not 
the result of acquiring a certain kind of knowledge, whether in 
deep meditation or otherwise. Liberation is the result of destroying 
the influxes. 
What does that mean: "destroying the influxes"? Once 
again, it appears that the early Buddhist tradition had no clue. And 
once again, we need appropriate theoretical notions if we wish to 
reach any form of understanding. For this reason, I beg your 
indulgence once again for presenting some theoretical notions that 
may help us to move ahead. These notions are tentative and 
necessarily speculative, but I do think that we must have the 
courage to enter uncharted territory if we wish to gain any kind of 
understanding. 
Before introducing these theoretical notions, I wish to 
illustrate the way in which the part of the Buddhist path in which 
Nårada was especially interested, the destruction of the influxes, is 
misunderstood, or rather ignored, in modern studies. I take this 
example from a recent book, The Science of Meditation, written by 
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Daniel Goleman and Richard J. Davidson (2017: 272), wherein we 
read: 
Soon after Siddhartha Gautama, the prince-turned-renunciate, 
had completed his inner journey at Bodh Gaya, he 
encountered some wandering yogis. Recognizing that 
Gautama had undergone some kind of remarkable 
transformation, they asked him, “Are you a god?” 
To which he replied, “No. I am awake.” 
The Sanskrit word for “awake”, bodhi, gave Gautama the 
name we know him by today, Buddha — the Awakened One. 
No one can know with absolute certainty what that 
awakening entailed, but our data on the most advanced yogis 
may yield some clues. For instance, there’s that high level of 
ongoing gamma, which seems to lend a sense of vast 
spaciousness, senses wide-open, enriching everyday 
experience — even deep sleep, suggesting an around-the-
clock quality of awakening. 
As is clear from this passage, Goleman and Davidson prefer 
their own speculations based on the word bodhi to what the early 
Buddhist texts repeat ad nauseam, viz. that awakening entailed the 
end of suffering and the end of desire. They ignore all that under 
the pretext of hiding behind the difference between science and 
religion, which, they say (copying the biologist Stephen Jay Gould): 
“represent disparate magisteria, realms of authority, areas of 
inquiry and ways of knowing.” “In taking the measure of the 
meditator’s mind”, they continue, “we do not speak to the truth-
value of what various religions make of those mental states.” It is 
possible that Mus¥la would have been delighted to read these words; 
Nårada certainly would not.9 
Let us now turn to the theoretical reflections I promised 
earlier. Recall that the transformation that results from the 
destruction of the influxes takes place in a state of deep absorption. 
We have seen that one of the features of absorption is that it 
reduces the number of associations, most of which are unconscious. 
In other words, absorption requires access to unconscious mental 
                                                           
9  Indeed, Goleman and Davidson (2017: 39) speak of enduring traits, such as 
equanimity, kindness, compassion, and joy, but then add: “Whether these 
traits are due to some specific transformative experiences that accrue in 
attaining those levels, or from the sheer hours of practice along the way, we 
can’t say.” No place here for the “destruction of the influxes.” 
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contents. There is another side to absorption, this one also 
connected with its access to unconscious mental contents: what it 
focuses on receives increased attention, and if it focuses on a 
mental content that is not normally conscious, this mental content 
can now become conscious. In other words, absorption can shed 
conscious light on mental contents that are not normally accessible 
to consciousness. How and why should or could this lead to the 
total psychological transformation that the Buddhist texts talk 
about? The preliminary answer must be that there are unconscious 
mental contents that are responsible for our suffering and desires. 
By shedding conscious light on these mental contents, they 
somehow lose their capacity for causing suffering and desire. How 
could this possibly work? 
It seems clear, then, that we need an understanding of what 
we are and how we “work” in terms of mental contents, including 
presumably memories of which we are not normally aware. This 
understanding should explain how conscious access to these mental 
contents can have a profound effect on what we are, with as upper 
limit the disappearance of psychological suffering and desire. 
It would no doubt be wisest to stop here and leave it to 
others more competent than I to develop a theory that fulfills these 
requirements. Rather than being wise, I have chosen to be reckless 
and look at what theories are around that might help us in our quest. 
Not many existing theories fit the bill. The most obvious 
candidate is Freudian psychoanalytic theory. Freudian 
psychoanalytic theory has many shortcomings and is decidedly out 
of fashion these days. In spite of this, I have made an attempt to 
use its best parts and confront them with the data provided by the 
Buddhist texts. The result is Part II of a book that came out some 
years ago, called Absorption: Human Nature and Buddhist 
Liberation (Bronkhorst 2012).10 
Freudian psychoanalytic theory is not the only theory that 
tries to explain what we are with the help of unconscious mental 
content. We all know that we are not consciously aware of all the 
activities we carry out. When we learn to drive a car, we have to be 
consciously aware of everything we do. Once we have learned it, 
                                                           
10  Perhaps because Freudian psychoanalytic theory is nowadays considered 
taboo in certain academic circles, my observations about the challenge 
presented by the early Buddhist texts have gone largely unnoticed. 
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we can leave this activity to our autopilot most of the time and pay 
attention to other things, such as, for example, a conversation with 
fellow passengers. Psychologists sometimes distinguish between 
the explicit and the implicit system of mental functioning. 11 The 
former concerns conscious activities, the latter the numerous 
unconscious activities on which we depend in our daily lives, and 
which consist largely of acquired habits. 
As said, we do not normally have conscious access to the 
implicit system, and we cannot but be grateful that we can leave so 
much of our daily activities to a system that takes care of so many 
details. However, this implicit system has aspects that are less 
attractive. Even so-called healthy people have ingrained habits and 
compulsions, even addictions, in the face of which they are quite 
helpless. These habits and compulsions may be the result of 
emotional experiences in our childhood, or of following the wrong 
examples at a susceptible age. Whatever the reason, we are, in a 
way, bunches of habits and compulsions that are beyond our 
conscious control; the implicit system contains knots that we are 
unable to disentangle. These knots may be thought of as emotional 
reactions that have found their way into the implicit system and 
henceforth determine to a large extent how we carry our bodies, 
how we interact with other people, and much else. In short, they 
constitute our character, the sum total of ways in which we interact 
with the world. Some specialists speak of body memory, 
emphasizing the role the body plays in maintaining and giving 
expression to the accumulated habits and compulsions that make 
up what we are (See, e.g., Fuchs 2012).  
There are good reasons to think that the explicit and 
implicit systems of mental functioning are relevant in 
understanding the early Buddhist texts. One of the practices they 
emphasize is mindfulness (Skt. smṛti / Pali sati) and I do not need 
to remind you that this practice consists in becoming consciously 
aware of activities of which we are normally not consciously aware. 
In other words, it aims at extending the explicit system of mental 
functioning at the expense of the implicit system. This may not 
seem of much use as long as ordinary activities are concerned: our 
ability to walk without falling over, our ability to speak, ride a 
                                                           
11  See Dietrich 2003, 2004; Dietrich & Audiffren 2011. On the relationship 
between the explicit system and absorption, see Mohr 2018. 
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bicycle, and much else. But it suggests that the aim of the exercise, 
that is, the aim of the Buddha's path, is to get at the knots in the 
system, at the sources of the habits and compulsions that make us 
prisoners of our character.  
Mindfulness by itself cannot disentangle those knots; it 
only paves the way by expanding the realm of conscious access. 
Absorption expands this realm even further, eventually giving 
conscious access to those knots. Disentangling those knots— 
which means: facing the emotions associated with fixed habits and 
compulsions without giving in to them as one has before — is, I 
propose, what is meant by destroying the influxes (åsravas). 
The idea that conscious access to the roots of unwelcome 
aspects of our character may be a step toward removing or 
reducing them is not altogether new.12 This is the method applied 
with some amount of success in various forms of psychotherapy 
(including hypnotherapy) and, of course, in the practice of 
mindfulness (See, e.g., Brewer 2017). Its effectiveness is further 
confirmed by recent research on psychedelic drugs, which are 
known to make unconscious mental content conscious; these drugs 
have been shown to be effective against addictions and 
depression.13 This research is still in its infancy, and we may expect 
further results in the future. It yet allows us to provisionally assume 
that compulsory behaviors can indeed be undone when the 
underlying unconscious associations have been made conscious. 
Let us now return to the destruction of the influxes, which 
constitutes the crucial transformation that is the culmination of the 
Buddhist path. I propose to understand this in the light of these last 
observations. Practitioners in deep meditation can have access to 
the unconscious associations that underlie the incorporated habits 
that make them what they are. By consciously going through the 
                                                           
12  One might speculate that consciousness allows the dissociation of the object 
and the dopamine rush that was responsible for the formation of the 
dispositional desire. 
13  See, e.g., Frood 2012; Krebs & Johansen 2012; Johnson et al. 2014; Carhart-
Harris et al. 2016; Ross et al. 2016; and Pollan 2018, esp. chapter 6, for a 
recent overview. According to Wong (2018), recent research suggests that 
psychedelic drugs make brain cells grow branches and form new 
connections. 
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knots, they free themselves from the habits and compulsions linked 
to them and become different, free persons.14 
What has all this to do with desire, and freedom from desire? 
Freedom from desire, from thirst (tṛṣˆå/taˆhå), is one of the 
essential goals of the Buddhist path. But what is the connection 
between habits and desire? 
Desire is close to what psychologists call wanting. Studies 
reveal that there is, both in humans and other animals, a difference 
between two psychological states, wanting and liking. The two can 
be connected, as when liking gives rise to wanting, but this is not 
always the case. People may want something without liking the 
result; and they may like something without wanting it. Wanting 
without liking typically happens in the case of addictions: smokers 
may want a cigarette without liking the effect it has on them; others 
may want to constantly consult their smartphone without liking this 
habit. The same can be said about many of our desires: we may 
want something without liking the result. In other words, most if 
not all desires are the result of habits and compulsions, broadly 
conceived;15 that is to say, they are the result of the knots in the 
                                                           
14  These "knots" do not have to be memories. See, for instance, Yovell, Solms & 
Fotopoulou (2015: 1533): "During the last three decades it was discovered 
that fear conditioning, a powerful type of implicit emotional learning, may 
be formed, experienced and remembered in the absence of a corresponding 
explicit memory (LeDoux, 1996). What this means is that someone may 
have an intense fear of a person, place or situation without any explicit 
memory of why they fear it. It is important to note that the corresponding 
implicit memory here is not repressed; it never existed in the first place. It 
simply was not encoded in the brain."  
15  See, e.g., Dill & Holton 2014. These authors distinguish between incentive 
salience desires, habits and cognitive desires. About the first they say: 
“incentive salience desires … are formed for objects on the basis of their 
previous association with either rewarding experience (when the system is 
functioning well) or artificial dopamine stimulation (when the system is 
hijacked by addictive drugs). These desires form the motivational basis of 
addiction, but also play an ever-present role in non-addicted agents´ 
motivation, encompassing at least the sphere of motives we normally call 
‘appetites’ even when these are well-regulated (desires for food, drink, sex, 
and many other typically pleasurable stimuli). Crucially, incentive salience 
desires motivate independently from an agent’s reflective judgments about 
what is valuable or even pleasurable. This distinguishes incentive salience 
desires from a second kind of desires, cognitive desires, which are sensitive 
to and based upon an agent’s reflective beliefs about what is valuable; e.g., 
the desire to read a certain book or pursue a certain career” (4). 
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implicit system.16 If these can be undone, desires will disappear. 
This includes, if we take the early Buddhist texts seriously, sexual 
and other desires that we do not normally associate with habit 
formation.  
Nårada, as we have seen, held on to a tradition that was 
losing terrain against its competitor, the cognitive understanding of 
the Buddhist path embodied by Mus¥la. As I said earlier, there are 
good reasons to think that Nårada was closer to the path taught by 
the Buddha. And yet, Nårada's point of view lost out, presumably 
for a simple reason: few people knew how to destroy the influxes 
because they had no idea what that meant. Nårada himself admitted 
that he had not succeeded in doing so. Without an appropriate 
theoretical context, few Buddhists of his time may have had a clue 
what it meant to destroy the influxes. The most important and 
crucial part of the path remained obscure to most if not all. 
Mus¥la's cognitive interpretation of the Buddhist path was 
far easier to deal with. An emphasis on the kind of knowledge that 
had to be acquired opened up new horizons of elaboration and 
refinement. It was destined to have a glorious future in the 
development of Buddhist thought, including Buddhist philosophy 
in its various manifestations. How much of the Buddha's original 
message survived in all this is an open question.17 
In this presentation, I have made some rather radical 
suggestions. I claim that the early Buddhist tradition preserves 
materials that it does not always understand. Faithful preservation 
was apparently more important than understanding.18 We owe it to 
this emphasis on faithful preservation that the Buddhist canon 
preserves information about a path that was no longer understood. 
This does not necessarily mean that we, modern scholars, are 
prevented from understanding what these texts are about. A 
                                                           
16  These are, of course, primarily the habits that some call incentive salience 
desires; see the preceding note. 
17 See Sujato 2005 on “how insight worsted tranquility in the Satipa††håna Sutta.” 
18  Recent voices, such as those of Gregory Schopen (1984: 9-22) and others, 
claiming that the early Buddhist canon contains only or primarily late 
material, have been countered by Anålayo 2012. The claim that the 
historical Buddha may not have existed (Drewes 2017) has been refuted by 
Hinüber and Wynne (both 2019). 
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condition for making progress is an improved understanding of the 
way our mind works. 
I have furthermore proposed two rudimentary theories 
which, I believe, can help us to understand the early Buddhist texts. 
These two theories concern (1) the importance and cognitive 
consequences of mental absorption, and (2) the role that knots in 
the implicit system of mental functioning and their undoing play in 
human behavior. It should be clear that I have only suggested a 
first outline for these theories, and that much further work on them 
remains to be done. 
You are free to reject both these theories. It will be harder to 
reject my observation that we need some theoretical scaffolding to 
understand what the early Buddhist texts are talking about. There 
are clear indications that many Buddhists, already at an early date, 
no longer had such an understanding. As a result, there were 
differences of opinion about the precise nature of liberating insight 
and, as illustrated in the story of Mus¥la and Nårada, uncertainty 
about the importance of liberating insight. And, as I have argued, 
there was complete lack of understanding of the most crucial steps 
of the path to liberation: the destruction of the influxes. For all 
these reasons, I think that the texts present us with a problem that 
we cannot hope to resolve until and unless we take up the 
challenge of elaborating an appropriate theoretical understanding 
of the functioning and capabilities of the human mind. 
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